The Iran-Iraq Nexus: Analyzing the PMF’s Power Dynamics and Proxy Warfare

By: Mukhlis Mukhlis

Background

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as Hashd al-Shaabi, were established in 2014 following a fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to combat the rise of ISIS. By 2016, the PMF had evolved into a formalized paramilitary force integrated within Iraq's security framework. The PMF encompasses approximately 67 factions, representing a diverse spectrum of ethnic and sectarian groups, though it is predominantly composed of Iran-aligned Shia militias loyal to Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This alignment provides Iran with strategic depth in Iraq, facilitating proxy operations amid escalating U.S.-Iran tensions.

Key Judgments

1. Force Composition: The PMF comprises an estimated 204,000 to 238,000 personnel, functioning as a hybrid state-paramilitary entity. Dominant Shia factions account for approximately 171,700 to 254,000 fighters, significantly enhancing Iran's proxy capabilities within Iraq and posing challenges to Baghdad's central authority.

2. Arsenal and Capabilities: The PMF's arsenal includes advanced Iranian-supplied missiles, such as the Zolfaghar with a 700 km range, as well as U.S.-origin heavy armor like M1 Abrams tanks. This combination supports asymmetric warfare, territorial control, and potential cross-border operations targeting U.S. and allied interests.

3. Iranian Support: Continuous Iranian support—encompassing training, funding, and weapon transfers—sustains the operational autonomy of the PMF. With a budget exceeding $3.4 billion allocated for 2024, this financial backing amplifies the PMF's operational independence and intelligence capabilities.

4. Integration Challenges: Ongoing efforts to integrate PMF units into the Iraqi security forces are likely to meet resistance, potentially escalating internal rivalries and regional tensions, including threats to U.S. personnel and infrastructure.

5. Demographic Composition: The PMF is predominantly Shia Arab (aligned with either Iran or Sistani), supplemented by Sunni fighters (16,000-40,000), Shia Turkmen (~4,000), and minority units such as Christian and Shabak fighters. The PMF is organized into 11 regional commands and brigade structures.

6. Operational Autonomy: Key factions such as the Badr Organization (10,000-50,000), Kataib Hezbollah (~10,000), and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (7,000-10,000) collectively represent around 171,700-254,000 fighters. These groups operate with considerable autonomy and maintain cross-border connections, particularly to Syria.

Force Structure and Manpower Assessment

The registered strength of the PMF fighters ranges from 204,000 to 238,000, with the potential for higher effective numbers through tribal affiliations and unregistered elements. This reflects significant growth from approximately 60,000 in 2014, driven by sustained recruitment efforts and budgetary support.

Armaments and Operational Capabilities

The PMF's arsenal is a blend of state-supplied Western equipment, Iranian transfers, and legacy systems, supporting a range of operations from counterinsurgency to territorial defense and offensive actions. Iranian enhancements focus on precision and standoff capabilities.

- Ground Vehicles and Armor: The PMF has access to U.S.-origin M1 Abrams tanks (approximately 140 across Iraqi forces, with a subset in PMF), Iranian-modernized T-72 variants, M113/BMP-1 armored personnel carriers (APCs), Humvees, and Iranian Toophan MRAPs/Safir jeeps for mobility and protection.

- Artillery and Rockets: The PMF employs Soviet M-46 howitzers, Iranian HM-20/Fajr-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and unguided 107/122 mm rockets for area saturation.

- Missiles and Advanced Weapons: Their arsenal includes short-range ballistic missiles like Zelzal (150-250 km), Fateh-110 (200-300 km), and Zolfaghar (700 km), alongside anti-tank systems (Dehlavieh ATGM) and various mortars (60-120 mm).

- Emerging Domains: The PMF is increasingly equipped with Iranian drones (e.g., Mohajer-6, Shahed series), electronic warfare jammers, and nascent air/intelligence units, supported by a $1.2 million secret fund.

- Small Arms Baseline: Standard infantry weapons include M16/M4 rifles, PKM machine guns, and various AK variants.

Iranian Influence and Support Mechanisms

Iran provides continuous logistical support, training, and funding through IRGC channels, ensuring that PMF factions demonstrate allegiance to Khamenei. This support enhances their operational capabilities despite U.S. sanctions, as evidenced by social media posts showcasing equipment parades. The budgetary autonomy, with $3.4 billion allocated in 2024, underscores the PMF's institutional entrenchment.

Implications and Outlook

The PMF's expansion poses significant risks to Iraqi stability, enabling Iran to exert power against U.S. forces, Israel, and regional adversaries. The missile capabilities of the PMF threaten Gulf states and U.S. military bases, while internal divisions may exacerbate sectarian tensions. Upcoming reforms in 2025 may seek to integrate or disarm certain elements, but resistance from Iran-backed factions is anticipated, raising the likelihood of escalation. Continuous monitoring is essential to track shifts in U.S.-Iraq security cooperation and Iranian proxy activities.

Major Developments

A recent convergence among leaders of Iraqi armed factions and political forces regarding limiting armed groups to the Iraqi government’s control is noteworthy. This consensus has been underscored by simultaneous statements from various armed factions expressing support for this initiative. Notable endorsements have come from the Secretary-General of the Imam Ali Brigades, Shibel Al-Zaidi, and the Secretary-General of the Asaib Ahl-Haq Movement, Qais Al-Khazali, along with representatives from the Ansar Allah Al-Awfia’a faction and the spokesman for the Sayyid Al-Shuhada Brigades.

Divergence Among Factions

Despite the announcements from four significant Iraqi armed factions committing to disarmament and calling for the restriction of weapons to state authority, the Hezbollah Brigades and the Nujaba’a Movement have publicly opposed this move. The President of the Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Faik Zeidan, expressed gratitude towards those factions that responded positively to his call for disarmament and engagement in political processes.

Cautious Political Maneuvering

The announcement from the Coordination Framework on December 22, 2025, supporting the idea of limiting armed groups to the state under clearly defined legal conditions appears to be a cautious political maneuver. Reports indicate that the Hezbollah Brigades and the Nujaba’a Movement have shown some flexibility following their initial rejection but have outlined specific demands that must be met before they consider relinquishing their arms.

Conditions for Disarmament

These demands, influenced by pressures from the Iranian regime on its Iraqi proxies, include stipulations that no decisions affecting the Popular Mobilization can be made prior to the formation of a new government. Additionally, the factions refusing to disarm have submitted a list of conditions, including guarantees that surrendered arms will be received exclusively by the Iraqi government (specifically the Ministries of Interior and Defense) and assurances against targeting their headquarters, military barracks, and private facilities.

Leadership Consensus

According to a reliable source, the leaders of the Coordination Framework have agreed that the decisions of the next prime minister will be entirely separate from the Popular Mobilization, indicating an attempt to delineate state authority from militia influence moving forward.

Strategic Directive from Iranian Leadership

Recent communications from Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, have urged the leaders of the so-called Axis of Resistance to adopt a strategy of political procrastination. He directed the armed factions in Iraq with a succinct statement: "Bow down until the storm passes and Trump leaves." This instruction suggests a tactical retreat in the face of current pressures, indicating a period of patience while awaiting a potential shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Impact of U.S. Policy

The recent initiative from some Shiite factions in Iraq to relinquish their weapons is likely influenced by the maximum pressure policy adopted by the administration of President Donald Trump. This strategy has begun to yield tangible results, either by neutralizing some regional forces or fostering closer views among parties to avoid prolonged conflicts and prevent the U.S. from becoming embroiled in chaos across the region.

Demilitarization as a Priority

The elimination of all armed movements operating outside the official state framework has become a critical political, military, and security priority. This demand is especially pronounced in countries controlled by armed groups engaged in proxy wars on behalf of Iran, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Ansar Allah group in Yemen. The active and influential presence of Iraqi militias loyal to the Iranian regime remains a serious concern for the U.S. and the international community.

However, it is essential to recognize that the recent initiative by some Shiite factions to relinquish their weapons, while influenced by U.S. pressure, is not straightforward. These factions seek to exchange their weapons without clearly defining the type, quantity, and category of these arms or the duration of the disarmament process. They are also demanding a greater political role and broader involvement in state institutions in return for handing over undefined arms.

Risks of Militia Control

The control of armed groups over politics and state institutions, especially military and security apparatuses, presents a significant risk. These dynamic places the assets, resources, and capabilities of Iraqi state institutions in the hands of groups ideologically and politically connected to the Iranian regime. Consequently, the state’s defense force, institutions, and resources may become subordinate to these factions under the guise of legality.

Deceptive Maneuvers

There is substantial evidence suggesting that this maneuver is an alternative Iranian strategy designed to distract the region and the world. It aims to deceive the U.S. and the international community into believing that these armed organizations are beginning to adopt a peaceful approach. This initiative is a form of political delay—strategic procrastination—intended to buy time until the U.S. midterm elections or the end of the current administration's term, with hopes of shifting U.S. foreign policy under a new administration.

Recommendations for Action

In light of the complex political landscape and the potential risks posed by armed factions, several strategic actions are recommended:

1. Dismantling Armed Groups: It is vital to dismantle and dissolve all armed groups and militias, regardless of their title, whether they operate under the PMF umbrella or independently.

2. Defining Disarmament Parameters: Clearly define and categorize the types of weapons that factions must surrender. It is impractical for some militias to hand over light weapons while retaining heavier arms, including non-conventional weapons like drones.

3. Establishing a Responsible Entity: Identify a responsible entity to receive, inventory, and manage these weapons before determining their future.

4. Addressing Criminal Accountability: Identify and hold accountable the groups and individuals involved in war crimes, violence, and assaults impacting civilians, Iraqi strategic establishments, and international coalition forces. These individuals should be excluded from the political process and brought to justice.

5. Recognizing Interconnectedness: Understand that the PMF, as an official body within the Iraqi state, and other armed factions are interconnected. It is crucial not to be misled by political manipulation that seeks to obscure these relationships. Claims that certain factions do not fall under the PMF structure should be closely scrutinized, particularly if they seek legal recognition under the guise of political gain. The PMF, as an official entity operating under Iraqi law, should not serve as cover for militias, equating them with the Iraqi army or other state institutions such as the Counter-Terrorism Forces and Iraqi Intelligence Services.

Conclusion

The dynamics surrounding the PMF and its relationship with Iran pose significant challenges to Iraq's stability and sovereignty. The interplay of political maneuvering, armed faction control, and external influences necessitates a comprehensive approach to ensure the long-term security and integrity of Iraq. Addressing the complex landscape of armed groups, fostering genuine disarmament, and establishing robust state authority are essential to mitigating the risks posed by militia influence and ensuring a cohesive national strategy moving forward. Continuous vigilance and strategic action will be crucial in navigating this multifaceted situation and promoting a stable and sovereign Iraq.

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Mukhlis Mukhlis is a seasoned expert in foreign affairs and strategic relations, with over two decades of experience in U.S. foreign policy, counterterrorism, national security, and Middle Eastern Affairs with an in-depth focus on Iraq and the Levant.